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Abstract
As in traditional commerce, parties to a contract in e-
business environments are expected to operate in good faith
and comply with mutually agreed terms of contract. It may
be the case however that deviation from the agreed contract
obligations occur either intentionally or due to force ma-
jeure. In this paper we argue that there is value in providing
various levels of automated support to deal with contract
non-compliance in e-marketplaces in order to reach the best
overall outcome for all parties. This includes monitoring
contract significant events, simple notifications to the par-
ties about non-compliance events and a range of enforce-
ment mechanisms. These mechanisms can be either non-
discretionary (as in preventive security mechanisms) or dis-
cretionary, which rely on a number of control mechanisms
that are applied when contract rules are violated. We de-
scribe a number of such control mechanisms and how they
can be used to extend capabilities of a contract management
architecture previously developed.
1. Introduction
There is a growing literature on research and implemen-
tation efforts on the provision of automated support for
the establishment and execution of electronic contracts (cf.
[16, 15, 1, 13, 9, 18, 4]). In general terms, e-contracting
covers a variety of services such as brokering to identify
The work reported in this paper has been funded in part by the Co-
operative Research Centre for Enterprise Distributed Systems Technology
(DSTC) through the Australian Federal Government’s CRC Programme
(Department of Industry, Science & Resources)
and match prospective business partners; negotiation be-
tween partners; lodging of signed electronic contract doc-
uments; contract performance monitoring; mediation, dis-
pute resolution and other activities aimed at facilitating cor-
rect contract-agreed behaviour. We refer to these last set of
activities as contract enforcement.
Electronic contract enforcement covers various mecha-
nisms for ensuring that actual behaviour of parties governed
by a contract is compliant with their expected behaviour as
stated in the contract. This includes both non-discretionary
approaches (e.g. as in preventive security mechanisms)
and discretionary approaches, which rely on various con-
trol mechanisms that are applied when contract rules are
breached. These two approaches can be illustrated with a
simple real life situation concerning certain rules when driv-
ing. There is nothing preventing me from passing a red light
or exceeding the speed limit, although both actions are pro-
hibited by law. Yet I know that passing a red light or exceed-
ing the speed limit are both breaches of law, so the expected
responsible behaviour is that I will control my actions and
comply. However, what the legal system actually enforces
is the penalty if it can be determined that I broke the law;
in fact it does not enforce the law itself - at least not in a
preventive manner. In addition, there are situations when
passing a red light and speeding can be judged responsible
behaviour, even in legal terms, for example if a passenger
is so seriously ill that breaching the law in order to arrive at
the hospital quickly is a question of life and death.
In e-business (as in real-life) enforcing a contract in a
non-discretionary manner - however desirable it may be, in
theory - can be too expensive and inefficient to implement.
That is why designers (or legislative/regulatory bodies) may
prefer to establish control mechanisms which react upon a
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violation of a law or an obligation in a discretionary manner
rather than prevent the violation itself. In other words the
system (or policy maker) exhibits trust in the actor to be-
have as prescribed, and if necessary takes corrective actions
upon the violation of the contract. Of course the extent to
which compliance with the contract can be left to the actor’s
discretion, depends on the level of trust in the actor.
The legal system, which traditionally is seen as the
strongest mechanisms for contract enforcement, is seen as
inappropriate for many e-commerce disputes [2]. Problems
include substantial legal costs, which often outweigh the
value of the transactions in dispute, and the fact that the
court process can be lengthy [17]. It can also be difficult
to determine which law applies to e-commerce disputes,
which authority has jurisdiction over a dispute, and whether
or not the decision is enforceable across borders. Although
legal mechanisms will remain as a means of enforcing elec-
tronic contracts, a range of alternative mechanisms that are
highly suited to electronic marketplaces, may be used to en-
able early resolution of deviations. In general, such mea-
sures that have the purpose of avoiding escalation of dis-
putes to the legal stage, have been called alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms (ADR) [2].
In this paper we present a set of mechanisms for support-
ing discretionary contract enforcement. Our approach can
be described as an ADR, and we show how it can be applied
to an architecture for electronic contracts management such
as the Business Contract Architecture (BCA) developed in
[14, 16, 15]. We begin by introducing mechanism needed to
support electronic contract management, including mecha-
nisms to increase trust between parties in contractual rela-
tionships. Section 3 then describes how these mechanisms
can be implemented in a role-based architecture supporting
the full contract life-cycle. Section 4 describes how the var-
ious stages of contract enforcement are tied together, and
section 5 provides an example that illustrates our approach.
The conclusion discusses some future research issues.
2. Mechanisms for Electronic Contracts
Various mechanisms are needed during the contract life
time. These are grouped into mechanisms supporting con-
tract establishment, mechanisms supporting contract execu-
tion, and finally mechanisms supporting trust.
2.1. Mechanisms for Contract Establishment
2.1.1 Storing Contract Templates
This mechanism allows for storing of contract templates
(i.e. standard contract forms and their building blocks) to
facilitate reuse when drafting contracts. The latter is moti-
vated by frequently adopted practices of lawyers (and other
authorities engaged in drafting contracts) to compose con-
tracts based on pre-defined contract clauses, boilerplates or
other building block for contracts. To this end, it is valu-
able to enable electronic storage of such building blocks
and their relationships, as needed. We note that these tem-
plates contain natural language description of contract frag-
ments or full standard contract forms, but can also include
data type information for certain fields. These fields are to
be filled to produce a specific contract instance - and the
data type information allows automated processing of vari-
ous aspects of contracts.
2.1.2 Contract Validity Checking
This mechanism ensures that contracts satisfy legal valid-
ity aspects such as competence, unambiguity, consideration
and legal purpose. Although the ultimate responsibility for
legality of contracts is left to humans, we envision that a
number of legal rules checking can be done by employ-
ing automated tools that enable checking contract policies
against legal policies of an outer legislative domain, check-
ing that the contract policies satisfy basic security mech-
anisms such as confidentiality, availability, accountability
and fairness and so on.
2.1.3 Negotiation Mechanisms
The purpose of negotiation mechanisms is to facilitate the
establishment of contractual agreements between parties.
Two broad categories exist. In a simpler case, where the
structure of contract template is fixed and pre-defined by
some other authority who prescribes contracts (as in most
standard contract forms, e.g. insurance contracts, real estate
contracts, service level agreements etc.) the negotiation is
referred to agreeing on the values in the contract as defined
in the standard contract form. A deal between two parties
is reached when a mutually agreed contract is arrived at. In
a more complex case the negotiation may include negotiat-
ing the structure of the contract (e.g. addition or removal
of certain clauses and other policies) and this may require
a more pro-active contract validity checking. In the case of
standard contract forms, this validity is effectively guaran-
teed by the contract drafter who issued the contract form in
the first place.
2.1.4 Storing Contracts
This is to keep evidence of contracts that are agreed by par-
ties. This mechanism represents a key feature for contract
automation (in effect replacing traditional filing cabinets).
3. It provides a basis to support various automated contract
management functions, such as notifications of contract ex-
piration and other more complex monitoring features.
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2.2. Mechanisms for Contract Execution
2.2.1 Contract Monitoring
Considering that actual party’s behaviour to a contract can
deviate from its agreed behaviour due to either their inter-
nal objectives of some other set of (possibly new) policies
imposed, there is a need to provide a mechanism that would
allow comparing actual vs. agreed behaviour. According to
the similar problem domain from control theory, a monitor-
ing mechanism can be put in place, performing a role sim-
ilar to a sensor. Such a mechanism allows defining which
contract significant events need to be observed and which
contract policies need to be evaluated to determine whether
there was a breach to the contract. Once such a deviation
has been detected, further measures can be taken to notify
parties about this breach or to provide some other interven-
tions, including corrective measures. We refer to all such
measures as contract enforcement. Contract enforcement
covers both the non-discretionary (or preventive) mecha-
nisms and discretionary mechanisms such as mediation and
arbitration as described below.
2.2.2 Contract Notifications
Contract Notification mechanisms allow for notifications
of parties involved in contract (or their proxies) about the
existing or possibly arising contract non-compliance - de-
tected during the monitoring activity. They can also be used
to send reminders to parties to perform actions specified by
contract.
2.2.3 Contract Mediation
Contract Mediation mechanisms offer the contractual par-
ties recourse to a fair, reliable and effective process for man-
aging situations where one or both parties deviate from the
agreed contract, i.e. there is a dispute.
The dispute mediation phase begins when a non-
compliance to contract is detected and a subsequent noti-
fications sent to the non-compliant party are not acted upon
to bring contract execution back on track. Next, a series of
interactions may result between contracting parties possibly
using third party services attempting to come to a resolu-
tion. A successfully settled dispute can be seen as a modifi-
cation or addition to the original contract.
2.2.4 Contract Arbitration
In conventional (non-electronic) contracting practice, com-
pliance with prescribed behaviour is typically evaluated in-
dividually by each party and where parties’ views differ,
disputes arise that require some form of resolution. Such
resolution is normally undertaken by an arbitrator whose
authority both parties recognise, or in extreme cases by a
judge in a court of Law. Resolution comes about on the
evidence presented by the parties (or their legal representa-
tives), about their individual actions in the course of their
exchange, with reference to their agreement. A human ar-
bitrator or judge arrives at a ruling, typically with no first-
hand access to the truth or falsity of the information sup-
plied by the parties or their representatives; under the En-
glish law, the concept of ”balance of probabilities” is used
to qualify a ruling. An arbitration mechanism can be com-
pared to the functionality of controller, from the domain of
control theory.
An interesting arbitration mechanism which makes use
of an artificial agent (or a collective of agents) is explored
in [3]. Here the agent undertakes the role of an e-market
controller that monitors contract execution and assesses any
deviations. The e-market controller has access to a repre-
sentation of the contract instances and the policy rules asso-
ciated with them.
The controller also has access to information provided
by advisors outside the parties directly participating in con-
tract execution. These may be certification authorities, rep-
utation systems, regulators or controllers of other associated
markets1. In the architecture explored in [3] the controller’s
decision-making is informed by the contract instance, and
each party’s view of whether its own and the counter-party’s
behaviour comply with it. Thus, the controller forms an
opinion on the basis of such evidence (and possibly addi-
tional recommendations from agents representing the par-
ties), in a spirit similar to a (human) judge’s process for
arriving at his ruling.
The controller may have limited or no means of estab-
lishing with absolute certainty that an action is indeed per-
formed as specified in the contract instance - parties may
maliciously or inadvertently misinform the controller. The
controller is therefore required to adopt an opinion about
what actually happened, based to some extent on the par-
ties’ opinions. In analogy to conventional, non-electronic,
settings, an agent’s forming of opinions on the basis of in-
formation supplied by other agents is subject to trust. As-
cending from the characterisation of trust provided in [5]2,
Subjective Logic [10] can be applied as the formal basis for
the evidence-based reasoning underpinning contract arbitra-
tion as described in [3]. A brief descriptions of Subjective
Logic including the operators discounting and consensus
1A taxonomy of mediating roles that commonly appear in e-business
exchanges is provided in [5] and some fundamental properties of trust re-
lationships between these roles are analysed in [7].
2Trust by a party A in a party B is understood in [5] as the measurable
belief ofA inB behaving dependably for a specified period within a speci-
fied context. Trust affords an agent reasonable grounds to rely for a critical
period on behaviour or on information communicated by another agent.
Its value relates to the subjective probability that an agent will perform a
particular action (which the trustor may not be able to monitor) within a
context, and in a dependable manner.
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can be found Section 5 and in the Appendix.
2.3. Mechanisms to Support Trust
Trust mechanisms can be employed at both the contract
establishment and contract execution phases in order to ad-
dress various uncertainties that may result in electronic con-
tracting environment.
2.3.1 Reputation Systems
Reputation systems have emerged as a method for foster-
ing trust amongst strangers in e-commerce transactions. A
reputation system gathers, distributes, and aggregates feed-
back about participants’ behaviour. These mechanisms can
help people make decisions about who to trust in electronic
marketplaces and may also provide an incentive for honest
behaviour, due to the fact that current behaviour will be re-
membered and may have consequences for future business
transactions[19]. Figure 1 illustrates how feedback is col-
lected from parties in past transactions, and how reputation
ratings are provided online for partners of potential future
transactions.
X Y
Reputation Rating Centre
Feedback Collection and
X Y
Reputation
ratings
FCRCC
Past transactions
Feedback
Potential future transaction
Figure 1. Collecting feedback and providing
reputation ratings
Several reputation systems have been deployed in prac-
tical applications or proposed in the literature, and a repu-
tation system that fits well into the requirements of contract
management systems is the so-called Beta Reputation Sys-
tem [12]. In contrast to most other reputation systems which
seem intuitive and ad hoc, the beta reputation system has a
firm basis in the theory of statistics. The reputation rating in
this system is in the range [ 1; 1] where -1 and 1 represents
the worst and best possible ratings respectively and 0 repre-
sents neutral rating. Feedback provided by the contractual
parties can be given a weight as a function of the transaction
value as well as of the feedback provider’s own reputation
rating. The system also incorporates the concept of forget-
ting which gradually reduces the weight of old feedback.
2.3.2 Generic Security Mechanisms
In spite of the fact that contracting mechanisms introduced
above provide a good basis for automating many mundane
aspects of contract management activities, they will not be
fully adopted unless there is sufficient trust in both the elec-
tronic contracting systems and other participants involved.
To this end, one needs to provide a number of mechanisms
which will facilitate increasing trust in these.
We consider trust as a more abstract concept from which
generic security mechanisms and other aspects of depend-
ability that underpin the validation and execution of e-
commerce contracts, can be refined. For example, usual
authentication security mechanisms can be applied to verify
that the identity of a contracting party is as claimed and au-
thorisation mechanisms allow giving a party access to sys-
tem objects based on its identity and with respect to agreed
terms and conditions. Next, confidentiality, integrity and
availability are security mechanisms that underpin the com-
petence aspect of a contract validation. Further, account-
ability (including non-repudiation) mechanism needs to be
put in place to make sure that parties involved in contract-
ing (and also the supporting third parties) are responsible
for their actions. Finally, fairness requires an ability of con-
tract management system to enforce contract execution, ei-
ther using some automated features of by means of human
involvement.
In summary, by exhibiting trust in the actions of an actor,
monitoring the actors behaviour, acting upon failure in trust
and adjusting the level of trust in an actor depending to re-
flect the deviation between actual and expected behaviour,
leads to more flexible contract performance monitoring and
contract enforcement architectures. This point will be elab-
orated in next sections.
2.3.3 Insurance
Insurance services for electronic commerce transactions
participate in a transaction as third parties that assist the es-
tablishment or facilitate the increase of trust for a specific
transaction by underwriting (a part of) the risk associated
with the transaction on behalf of the insured actor. Entities
providing insurance services that cover from financial loss
caused by a fraudulent transaction on the Internet include
credit card companies, who protect the card holder by un-
derwriting (part of the) loss from stolen or misused credit
cards, and merchant insurance providers, who protect the
supplier against fraudulent transactions and charge backs by
providing Cardholder Not Present (CNP) fraud insurance3.
3See http://www.iib.com.au/e-commerce.html for an ex-
ample of CNP insurance.
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3. Role-Based Architecture for Contract Es-
tablishment and Execution
This section describes the basic components of an archi-
tecture that implements the mechanisms from Sec.2. Fig-
ure 2 depicts this role-based architecture, and indicates key
information flow between the roles which in general are
involved in more than one process. The architecture rep-
resents an extension of the Business Contract Architecture
(BCA) described in [14, 16, 15].
3.1. Roles Supporting Contract Establishment
The following roles supporting the process of establish-
ing a contract.
 Negotiator mediates the negotiation process (alterna-
tively this can be carried out by the parties themselves).
During the negotiation phase parties can exchange
contract templates (offers and counter-offers). Con-
tract templates may be submitted for validity checking.
 Validator ensures the creation of legally valid contract
instances, assessing proposed contracts against various
aspects of contract validity such as competence, clar-
ity, legal purpose and consideration elements. See [15]
for further details on contract validation.
 Notary is a trusted party that stores contract instances
after the contract has been agreed upon, checked for
validity and signed by both parties. Such contract in-
stances can be later used as evidence of agreement
in the contract monitoring and enforcement activities.
Notary component can be also hosted by one or both
parties involved in contract.
 Contract Forms Repository provides storage and ac-
cess to standard contract forms or contract clauses, de-
pending on contractual scenario. It can be used by
parties to the contract who use pre-defined contract
forms to produce individual contract instances or by
contract drafters who are defining building blocks for
contracts. There may be also a need for a specialised
contract templates editor that can provide functional-
ity of both text editing but also type definitions for the
fields within the contract.
3.2. Roles Supporting Contract Execution
The following roles support discretionary contract en-
forcement during the performance of a contract.
 Monitor enables monitoring of the activities of par-
ties, measuring their performance and recording the
relevant events. It can also signal a contract non-
performance to the Discretionary Enforcement Mod-
erator (DEM, see below) if it detects such an event.
Monitor is subscribed to contract significant events and
when these occur, it evaluates the policies for these
events, against the agreements that are stored in No-
tary. Contract Monitor can be likened to a sensor that
passes the result of evaluation to other components,
as needed. These other components can be a Notifier,
which simply send notifications formatted in appropri-
ate way to the parties involved or to a DEM compo-
nent, to do some further more sophisticated processing
such as mediation and arbitration.
 Notifier implements various notifications mechanisms
needed to send warning messages to indicate a pend-
ing contract-significant event, including possible non-
compliance event that may be detected. To simplify
presentation, Notifier is not shown in the figure.
 Enforcer applies enforcing actions in a non-
discretionary way directly to the parties to ensure
that some specific behaviour conforms with the con-
tract. Alternatively it can inform the Contract Validator
which may prevent further access to the system by the
non-performing parties. From a control theory point of
view, this role is analogous to an actuator.
 Discretionary Enforcement Moderator (DEM)
forms an opinion about the extent of deviation by the
non-performing parties. Although we do not mandate
any particular solution to describe how an arbitrator
arrives at this opinion, we believe that often this
well be based on second-hand evidence, and if some
quantative method can be used to guide this process,
we propose the use of Subjective Logic.
Once the arbitrator forms such an opinion, it chooses
a route of action which may invoke settlement leading
to the success of a suitably amended transaction. Al-
ternatively, it may endorse the enforcement of correc-
tive measures to be executed by a preventive security
mechanism realised by the Contract Enforcer role. (An
overview of the Moderator’s decision making proce-
dure is modelled as a finite state machine in Figure 3.)
The DEM forms its opinions on the basis of evidence
about deviation of the non-performing parties, that is
provided by the Contract Monitor, external advisors,
and possibly additional recommendations from agents
representing the parties, in a spirit similar to a (human)
judge’s process for arriving at his ruling.
During this process the DEM component may take the
following specific roles (which can be viewed as re-
finements of the Moderator role).
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Figure 2. Roles
– Mediator who initiates a settlement leading to
the success of an amended transaction or decides
failure of mediation leading to the invocation of
arbitration. If the agreed contract deals with the
observed deviations by non-performing parties,
then the mediator may choose to send notifica-
tions to the non-performing parties - that they
should comply with the rules pertinent to such
deviations. In some cases, contract amendment
may be necessary, in which case the Contract Ne-
gotiator and the Contract Validator may need to
be involved in order to bring about a settlement
and produce an amendment to the contract.
– Arbitrator who takes over when a settlement as
per above cannot be reached, or when a party’s
deviation from the expected performance is high
enough to justify the deployment of corrective
measures. An arbitrator may initiate the enforce-
ment of corrective measures through the Contract
Enforcer, leading to the recoverable failure of the
transaction and, potentially to penalising the non-
performing party. In the absence of any suit-
able corrective measures, the Arbitrator may sig-
nal correction failure, in which case the Contract
Validator is informed so as to prevent further ac-
cess to the system by the non-performing parties,
if necessary, and the case is carried on outside the
Contract Architecture.
3.3. Roles Supporting Trust Establishment
We distinguish three special roles that entities mediat-
ing in a trust relationship can play in relation to contract
establishment and execution. These roles are guarantors,
advisors and reputation repositories. In addition comes the
more general role of intermediaries.
 Guarantor is a party taking the responsibility that the
obligations of the parties she acts as a guarantor for
are fulfilled at an agreed standard. Guarantors assist
the establishment or facilitate the increase of trust for
a specific transaction by underwriting (a part of) the
risk associated with the transaction. A typical example
is a credit card company.
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 Advisor is a party that offers recommendations about
the dependability of another party. Advisors include
the authorities maintaining blacklists for a community.
Examples include, credit scoring authorities and repu-
tation systems.
 Feedback Collection and Reputation Rating Cen-
tre (FCRRC) gathers feedback about a participant’s
behaviour over time, enabling a reputation rating to be
derived for that participant. This has the potential to
be utilised at a number of stages in the contracting pro-
cess. In the first instance, an Advisor may utilise rep-
utation ratings to assess a potential e-commerce part-
ner prior to the establishment of a contract. The Ad-
visor may have access to a range of external reputa-
tion systems, including reputation systems shared by
a trusted network of business partners. The Advisor
may also have access to an internal Feedback Collec-
tion and Reputation Rating Centre, which has gathered
specific information about the business’s prior interac-
tions with the business partner being assessed.
Information gathered by the FCRRC may also be
taken into account by the Arbitrator in the arbitration
decision-making process should a dispute arise, allow-
ing for a more informed decision to be made.
While certain external reputations systems may be sub-
ject to bias and remain open to manipulation by dis-
honest parties [17], tight controls are inherent in the in-
ternal reputation system. A reputation system utilised
by a trusted network of businesses may also provide a
more trusted source of reputation ratings than external
systems. Using Subjective Logic, the Advisor and the
Arbitrator may take these variations into account and
derive an accurate overall reputation rating for partners
in e-business contracts.
 Intermediary is a party that intervenes between other
parties in a business transaction and mediates so that
they establish a business relationship with or with-
out their knowledge. Unlike advisors, an intermediary
may also participate in a contract establishment or ex-
ecution providing access to the services provided by
another party, or as a third party representing a service
provider. Examples of intermediaries include proxies,
information portals, banks who offer to their customers
non-financial services such as car rental or flight book-
ings through an allied service provider, bookshops who
offer product delivery by a third party courier as a part
of their service. Intermediaries are further classified in
[5] with respect to whether they reveal the existence or
identity of the party the mediate for.
4. Electronic Contract Enforcement
To have a flexible approach for dealing with deviations
from prescribed agreements can serve several purposes.
Firstly it provides a set of procedures for handling devia-
tions and settling disagreements. Secondly it serves as an
incentive for contractual parties to comply with the agree-
ment because they know that deviations from the agreement
will provoke some sort of reaction. Finally it will make the
e-marketplace more attractive as an environment for com-
panies to conduct business because discretionary contract
enforcement will better suit the needs and requirements of
individual companies. The contract enforcement process
can be considered as a finite state machine as illustrated in
Figure 3 below.
Transition between states is governed by outcomes of
previous states. Conceptually the execution of a contract
will be situated on one of five possible levels at any one
time, as illustrated in Figure 3. The five different levels
reflect the degree with which the transaction execution is
on compliance with the prescribed agreement. Level 1 re-
flect full compliance whereas level 5 reflect total transac-
tion failure and the inability to apply corrective measures to
the non-compliant party. The states and transitions between
states are described in more detail below.
 Level 1 reflects the fact that the transaction is exe-
cuted according to the prescribed contract. The mon-
itor observes contract-significant events and evaluates
whether the corresponding behaviour pattern was com-
pliant with the contract. Deviations can occur while
the execution remains on level 1 as long as notifica-
tions to the contractual parties by the Monitor results
in the execution getting back on track. After transac-
tion completion, the contractual parties are invited to
provide feedback about each others performance. The
feedback is collected by the Feedback Collection Cen-
tre and is used to derive a reputation rating about each
party in the system.
 Level 2 reflects the fact that the transaction has de-
viated from the prescribed contract, and warnings to
non-compliant parties have been ignored. The Monitor
informs the DEM which in turn invokes the Mediator
which is closely linked to the Negotiator. The Medi-
ator/Negotiator attempts to establish an amended con-
tract between the two parties. In case of settlement the
contract execution returns to Level 1 and resumes with
the amended contract as basis. After transaction com-
pletion the contractual parties provide feedback about
each others performance.
 Level 3 reflects the fact that the mediation failed, i.e.
that the Mediator was not able to make the contrac-
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Figure 3. State diagram for enforcing contracts
tual parties agree on an amended contract. The Arbi-
trator collects all available evidence in order to reach
the fairest decision possible. In case the decision by
the Arbitrator is accepted by both parties, the contract
execution returns to Level 1 and resumes with the arbi-
trated contract as basis. After transaction completion
the contractual parties provide feedback about each
others performance.
 Level 4 reflects the fact that the arbitration decision is
not accepted by one or both of the contractual parties.
The DEM attempts to apply penalties to the parties it
sees as non-compliant. Feedback is not collected from
the contractual parties because it is assumed that the
hostility between them will make the feedback highly
biased and unreliable. Penalties are applied, e.g. in the
form of downgraded reputation by the DEM, (i.e. not
by the transaction partners.)
 Level 5 reflects the fact that the DEM was not able to
apply penalties to the non-compliant parties. The suf-
fering parties have the option of initiating legal pro-
cedures. This means that the contract execution ex-
its the electronic contractual management and that it
enters the realm of the traditional legal system. This
might not be practical in many situations (too expen-
sive, slow, uncertainty about which legal domain ap-
plies etc.) but it is the last resort.
5. Contract Enforcement: Example
We describe an example with four scenarios of how a
service level agreement between an e-commerce Merchant
and an ISP (Internet Service Provider) can be enforced. Al-
though the example is superficially simple, it exhibits some
features that are typical of lengthier, more complex agree-
ments in various domains. A certain future behaviour is
stipulated for the parties, and provision is made in case of
deviation from the agreement. The example can serve to il-
lustrate the main points raised in this paper without loss of
generality.
In the example, a service level agreement between the
Merchant and the ISP expresses that the ISP shall host the
Merchant’s Web site at the rental charge of $100 per month.
The agreed quality of service states, among other things,
that unavailability of the Web site due to server down-time
shall be maximum 2 hours per month. Rental discounts of
$10 apply for every additional 2 hours that the down time
exceeds the maximum. A down time exceding 1 day per
month is considered contract breach, in which case it is
likely that mediation would be needed to settle disputes.
Once the contract has been agreed upon, the contract in-
stance is stored in the Notary, and the contract execution
initialised to state S
0
. During service execution the Moni-
tor tracks the activities of the Merchant and the ISP fromo
month to month, checking their performance and recording
the relevant events. Figure 4 below provides a state diagram
of possible contract execution scenarios.
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Figure 4. State diagram for the Service Level
Agreement example
In this example we use Subjective Logic [10] as the ba-
sis for reasoning about the evidence from the contract ex-
ecution and for reaching enforcement decisions. Subjec-
tive Logic uses a belief metric called opinion to express be-
liefs about the truth of statements. An opinion is a tuple
!
A
x
= (b; d; u), where the subscript x denotes a particular
statement and the superscript A denotes the owner of the
opinion about the statement. The parameters b, d and u rep-
resent belief, disbelief and uncertainty respectively. These
parameters satisfy b+d+u = 1 where b; d; u 2 [0; 1]. This
is a sub-additive probability model where the probability of
truth (b) and the probability of falsehood (d) not necessar-
ily add up to 1. The advantage of sub-additivity is that it
is possible to express degrees of uncertainty regarding the
probability of a particular event.
The discounting operator denoted by
makes it possible
to take second-hand evidence into account, i.e. advice from
third parties. The consensus operator denoted by  allows
the combination of advice coming from different sources.
See the Appendix for a detailed description of these oper-
ators. The probability expectation value of an opinion is
defined as E(!) = b + u=2. The calculations in the exam-
ple have been done with the java Calculate class from the
DSTC SL-API repository [8].
The Beta Reputation System [12] is compatible with
Subjective Logic in the sense that there exists a bijective
mapping between a beta reputation and the opinion metric
used in Subjective Logic. When reference is made to an
agent’s reputation in the scenarios below it can be assumed
that it has been generated with the Beta Reputation System
and mapped to an opinion.
5.1. Scenario A: Contract Compliance
Assume that the Monitor determines on the basis of first
hand evidence (i.e. through its monitoring of the service
execution) that the provided service was not according to
agreed quality, e.g. that the Merchant’s Web site has been
unavailable for 4 hours during one month due to down time
in the ISP’s host servers. As the evidence may be partial (i.e.
the unavailability could have other causes than ISP server
down-time), the Monitor’s confidence on the deviation from
the agreed level of quality can be expressed in Subjective
Logic notation. In this case we asume this to be: !Monitornot  =
(0:9; 0:0; 0:1). In the presence of the evidence provided by
the Monitor, a warning is sent to the ISP that $10 needs to
be discounted from the monthly charges. The ISP complies
with the warning and discounts $10 from the Merchant’s
bill. The Monitor puts the contract execution state to S
1
,
checks that the discounted payment is made and changes
the execution state to S
2
.
5.2. Scenario B: Contract Breach
Assume that the Merchant complains that its Web site
has been unavailable for 2 days, and that he is convinced
that this is due to ISP server down-time. The following
information is communicated.
!
Merchant
not  = (0:9; 0:0; 0:1) The Merchant’s opinion
that the ISP server was
down.
!
ISP
not  = (0:0; 0:8; 0:2) The ISP’s opinion that the
the ISP server was down.
The following opinions of the Mediator relate to the
reliability of the ISP and the Merchant based on past ex-
perience (stored in FCRRC) and their role in the transaction.
!
Mediator
ISP = (0:3; 0:1; 0:6) The ISP’s reputation.
!
Mediator
Merchant = (0:8; 0:0; 0:2) The Merchant’s reputation.
The Mediator combines the existing evidence and forms
the opinion:
!
Mediator:(ISP,Merchant)
not 
= (!
Mediator
ISP 
 !
ISP
not ) (!
Mediator
Merchant 
 !
Merchant
not  )
= (0:662; 0:081; 0:257):
(1)
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The probability expectation value is given by
E(!
Mediator:(ISP,Merchant)
not  ) = 0:791. Assuming that a
minimum value of 0.7 is defined as a threshold for the
Mediator to pronounce a decision, the conclusion can be
drawn that a contract breach has taken place, and that the
contract execution now is in state S
3
.
The Merchant claims that he has lost business worth a
substantial amount and seeks $1000 compensation from the
ISP. The ISP argues that the unavailability probably was due
to some denial of service attack for which it could not be
blamed, and propose not to charge any rent for that month.
The Mediator checks the instances of the contract stored
in the Notary and determines that such a deviation has not
been considered in the contract. The case is then referred to
the Mediator implementing a Level 2 contract enforcement
process.
The Mediator assesses alternative contract amendments
seeking advise based on FCRRC data and (potentially rec-
ommendations from external advisors) about the compe-
tence of the parities involved and the effectiveness of differ-
ent candidate amendments. Finally, it decides to reject the
Merchant’s suggestion as disproportional to the deviation
and delegates to the Negotiator the brokerage of a deal con-
stituting an amendment to the existing contract. Free rental
for two additional months is suggested in order to initiate
the negotiation of the contract amendment. The ISP rejects
this suggestion and makes a counter offer of free rental for
one additional month, which is subsequently rejected by the
Merchant. Finally the ISP and the Merchant agree on free
Web site rental for one additional month and 50% discount
for the subsequent month.This can be regarded as an addi-
tional clause to the contract and can reference the original
contract.
With the Merchant and the ISP having reached a mu-
tually acceptable amendment, which has been validated by
the Validator, the Negotiator closes the amendment negotia-
tion and informs Mediator who decides that a settlement has
been reached. The contract execution is in state S
1
and back
on track with an amended contract stored at the Notary.
5.3. Scenario C: Mediation Failure
Assume that the Merchant complains that a contract
breach has taken place because down time has exceeded
1 day, and communicates this by means of an opinion
!
Merchant
not  = (0:9; 0:0; 0:1). The ISP on the other hand
claims that based on first hand evidence  has been met.
The ISP communicates this information to the Monitor by
means of an opinion about ‘not ’ expressed by !ISPnot  =
(0:0; 1:0; 0:0).
As the ISP and the Merchant have highly conflicting
opinions about the state of the contract, mediation is not
possible and the Arbitrator is invoked. In the presence of
a potential dispute, the Arbitrator has to weigh its own evi-
dence and consider the recommendations from its advisors,
in addition to the information sent by the ISP and the Mer-
chant in order to form a judgement. We assume that the
Arbitrator has formed an opinion !Selfnot  = (0:3; 0:0; 0:7)
on the basis of its own evidence and that the Advisor sends
recommendation !Advisornot  = (0:2; 0:6; 0:2).
In order for the Arbitrator to weigh the evidence received
he must have formed an opinion about the reliability of the
evidence-providers for that particular purpose. Let this be
expressed as:
!
Arbitrator
Self = (0:9; 0:0; 0:1) Arbitrator’s trust in itself4
!
Arbitrator
Advisor = (0:8; 0:1; 0:1) Arbitrator’s trust in Advisor
!
Arbitrator
ISP = (0:3; 0:1; 0:6) Arbitrator’s trust in ISP
!
Arbitrator
Merchant = (0:8; 0:0; 0:2) Arbitrator’s trust in Merchant
The following formula encodes the opinion formation pro-
cess of the Arbitrator, where all evidence is first weighed
against trust in the corresponding evidence provider and
then combined equally and fairly.
!
Arbitrator:(Self,Advisor,ISP,Merchant)

= (!
Arbitrator
Self 
 !
Self
not ) (!
Arbitrator
Advisor 
 !
Advisor
not  ) 
(!
Arbitrator
ISP 
 !
ISP
not ) (!
Arbitrator
Merchant 
 !
Merchant
not  )
= (0:551; 0:287; 0:163)
(2)
The probability expectation value is given by
E(!
Arbitrator:(Self,Advisor,ISP,Merchant)
not  ) = 0:633. The prob-
ability expectation value may be used to make an informed
decision that the claim ‘not ’ is valid and hence put
the state of the contract execution to S
3
. Of course, it is
very difficult to decide what ”the balance of probabilities”
should be! In the example above, it is clear that should
the Arbitrator decide in favour of ‘not ’ it would mean
that the threshold value is less than 0.633. (Any value
above 0.5 could reasonably be considered.) However, if the
threshold value is greater than 0.633, then the Arbitrator
needs to make another decision: either support the ISP, as
the Merchant’s assertion was not proved on ”the balance of
probabilities”, or seek further evidence, if available.
As an example, we assume that the ISP server down-time
is in dispute with E(!Arbitrator:(Self,Advisor,ISP,Merchant)not  ) = 0:633
and that the threshold for imputing blame on the ISP is 0.7.
The Arbitrator decides to consult (seek a recommendation
from) the ISP’s external security Auditor, which it consid-
4As explained in [6], an agent is aware of its degree of trust in itself.
Self-assessment underlies an agent’s ability to seek external advice and to
delegate or offer a task to another agent, so as to improve efficiency or
reduce risk.
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ers to be a reliable source of information, i.e. !ArbitratorAuditor =
(0:9; 0:0; 0:1). The Auditor offers the opinion, with great
certainty, that the ISP server was in operation without
down-time for the whole month, and supports the ISP with
!
Auditor
not  = (0:0; 0:9; 0:1). As a consequence the Arbitrator
updates its opinion to !Arbitrator:(Self,Advisor,ISP,Merchant,Auditor)not  =
(0:325; 0:579; 0:096) with the probability expectation
value E(!Arbitrator:(Self,Advisor,ISP,Merchant,Auditor)not  ) = 0:373.
Hence, the Arbitrator decides that  has been fulfilled and
that the contract execution is in state S
1
. The Contract
Arbitrator signals the decision, via the Negotiator, to the
Merchant, asking him to comply by executing . Under
the pressure of the arbitration decision the Merchant finally
pays, sending the execution to its final state S
2
.
5.4. Scenario D: Arbitration Failure
We consider the same scenario as in scenario C above,
except that this time the Merchant refuses to pay, sending
the execution to state S
4
. We assume that the Arbitrator has
decided that the ISP provided the service with agreed qual-
ity, but that the Merchant refuses to accept the arbitration
decision. The Discretionary Enforcement Moderator can
do nothing more to broker an agreement between the ISP
and the Merchant, sending the execution into state S
5
. The
Contract Enforcer will try to apply some form of penalty or
correction to the party it considers to be at fault. The op-
tions can for example be to downgrade the Merchant’s rep-
utation or to revoke his authorisation to conduct business
within the BCA. The ISP can of course cancel the contract
with the Merchant.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a range of options for supporting en-
forcement in contract management systems. The premise of
this paper is that deviations from contract occur sufficiently
often to deserve the investigation of possible automated so-
lutions to facilitate dealing with such deviations. Our belief
is that human will always be in the decision loop, but the
sheer amount of contracts and their link to other parts of
enterprise systems calls for an increased level of their au-
tomation. One of the problem that need to be addressed
to achieve this is to provide certain level of determination
about parties performance to the agreement and based on
that to undertake appropriate corrective measures.
Our approach to this particular problem is based on
crisp separation of roles that represent various enforcing
options as part of an overall (role-based) contract manage-
ment architecture. The roles presented in this paper are
contract monitor, notifier, discretionary enforcement mod-
erator (with its mediator and arbitrator role options) and
non-discretionary contract enforcer. The paper also shows
a way of providing quantitative assessment of parties be-
haviour based on second-hand evidence and by adopting an
approach based on Subjective Logic. We used the previ-
ously developed Business Contract Architecture (BCA) as
an example architecture to describe this value added func-
tionality.
The BCA roles described are specified in a platform in-
dependent manner so that the BCA can be implemented
using any specific technology available (e.g. J2EE, .Net,
CORBA etc). We use Web Services standards to implement
BCA components such as Notary, Monitor and the DEM
components.
There are several related research topics that we plan to
investigate in future. One problem is determining legal va-
lidity of contracts after it has been drafted, in particular the
legal purpose of the contract, namely its compliance with
the rules of an outer legal system. Another problem is ensur-
ing the completeness of contracts to minimise possible situ-
ations where contracts are ’silent’, i.e. do not cover all pos-
sible conditions of interest. Finally, we are planning to in-
vestigate feasibility of automated negotiation for contracts,
which also need to rely on sound validation mechanisms.
Appendix: Subjective Logic Operators
The Subjective Logic operators used in the example of
Section 5 are the discounting operator which supports the
incorporation of second-hand evidence, and the consensus
operator which allows the combination of evidence from
different sources. The interpretations of, and the algebraic
expressions for these operators are given below. A more
complete description of these and other operators of Subjec-
tive Logic can be found in [10]. See [8] for online demon-
strations and resources.
 Discounting. Assume two agents A and B where A
has an opinion about B (i.e. that “B is knowledgeable
and will tell the truth”) denoted by !A
B
. In addition
B has an opinion about a proposition x, denoted by
!
B
x
. Agent A can then form an opinion about x by dis-
counting B’s opinion about x with A’s opinion about
B, denoted by !A:B
x
. By using the symbol ‘
’ to des-
ignate this operator, we define !A:B
x
= !
A
B

 !
B
x
.
 Consensus. The consensus of two possibly conflicting
opinions is an opinion that reflects both opinions in a
fair and equal way. Let !A
x
and !B
x
be A’s and B’s
opinions about the same proposition x. The opinion
!
A;B
x
is then called the consensus between !A
x
and !B
x
,
denoting an imaginary agent [A;B]’s opinion about
x, as if she represented both A and B. By using
the symbol ‘’ to designate this operator, we define
!
A;B
x
= !
A
x
 !
B
x
.
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Discounting: Consensus:
!
A:B
x
= !
A
B

 !
B
x
!
A;B
x
= !
A
x
 !
B
x
Belief: bA:B
x
= b
A
B
b
B
x
b
A;B
x
=
b
A
x
u
B
x
+b
B
x
u
A
x
u
A
x
+u
B
x
 u
A
x
u
B
x
Disbelief: dA:B
x
= b
A
B
d
B
x
d
A;B
x
=
d
A
x
u
B
x
+d
B
x
u
A
x
u
A
x
+u
B
x
 u
A
x
u
B
x
Uncer- uA:B
x
= u
A;B
x
=
u
A
x
u
B
x
u
A
x
+u
B
x
 u
A
x
u
B
x
tainty dA
B
+ u
A
B
+ b
A
B
d
B
x
Remark: Limits can be computed [11] for uA
x
= u
B
x
= 0.
Table 1. Overview of the Subjective Logic op-
erators used in this paper
The complete definition of these as well as other oper-
ators can be found in [10]. In addition to the parameters
belief, disbelief and uncertainty, the operators can also con-
tain a parameter called relative atomicity. In the example of
Section 5 the relative atomicity is not relevant and has there-
fore been omitted. When using the java Calculate class from
the SL-API for the numerical calculations the relative atom-
icity was set to the default value of 0.5. See [8] for online
Subjective Logic demonstrations and SL-API resources.
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